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Knowledge Management in the World of  
18th Century Chinese Business 
 
Carl A. Trocki 
 
This paper looks at the rise of new forms of Chinese business relationships with 
Southeast Asia in the eighteenth century. I have identified the beginning of the eighteenth 
century as an important era because it ushered in a new stage in China’s economic 
relationship with the region. It led to changes which were crucial for the foundation of 
Singapore and which became the basis of Singapore’s trade and economic position during 
much of the nineteenth century. It also highlights the role of the Straits-born or Baba 
Chinese who were resident in Southeast Asia at the time as the key knowledge managers 
in these events. 
While it is difficult to connect all of the dots in the picture, given the scarcity of 
documentation, there is enough of a paper trail to give us an approximate picture of what 
took place and how the new structures emerged. The story is something of a mystery 
story, but it shows us how possession of key pieces of knowledge and how careful 
management of that knowledge made it possible for a small group of Chinese merchants, 
most of them located in Southeast Asia, to identify an opportunity and to use it to their 
advantage. 
An important part of their situation was, it seems, an understanding of the current 
market demands for two key products: tin and tea on the part of a few well-placed Chinese 
merchants in Southeast Asia. It was necessary for them to know the intricacies of the 
supply chain and how to organize the movement of goods and to finance the overall 
project. What new knowledge did they uncover and how did they exploit it? 
Our own knowledge of this period has been pretty vague up to the present, but 
recent scholarship has uncovered a few important facts that help us to understand the 
situation at that time. Scholars have known for a long time that the tin and the tea trades 
were well-established arms of commerce in the 18th century. Tea, of course, was an 
important Chinese export, increasingly to the west. In particular, the increasing demand 
from the British East India Company (EIC) to feed the British market was an important 
challenge. Tin, on the other hand, was a key import to China from Southeast Asia. There 
was, however, until recently, little understanding of the links between the two. 
Looking at tin, considerable work was done on the subject. In 1965 by the late 
Raffles Professor of History at the National University of Singapore (NUS), Prof. Wong 
Lin Ken published his classic study The Malayan Tin Industry. He examined most of the 
available British sources and his book immediately became the standard work on the field, 
and in many ways has yet to be surpassed (Wong 1965). The Malay Peninsula and the 
geological formations that continue into the Straits of Melaka and the South China Sea 
represent one of the largest tin deposits in the world. Throughout the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, tin was one of the two major exports of Malaya, and was an important 
component of Singapore’s commerce. 
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, China was the world’s major 
consumer of tin. The Dutch East India Company (VOC) was active in attempting to 
monopolize the trade. The Company tried to prevent independent Chinese traders as well 
as British country traders from engaging in the tin trade at places such as Palembang, 
Perak, Selangor, and other Malay states. The Dutch hoped to keep the price relatively high 
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and to avoid glutting the Chinese market and forcing a drop in the price. It seems, 
however, that the market was much larger than Dutch perceptions, and ultimately their 
efforts were futile. 
The demand for tin was well-established and continued to grow throughout the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries even before the advent of the canning industry. With 
the expansion of European interest in tin, Malaya’s economy took off and it became 
firmly tied to industrial expansion in the West. By the mid-twentieth century Malaya was 
producing about 90 percent of the world’s tin. This, of course, is a well-known story. 
What is not so clear is just how it came to be such a massive industry. 
A part of the accepted knowledge about this is that Europeans wanted tin and that 
they “brought the Chinese in” to do this for them. This is an interesting story, and is one 
that can be found in almost every book about the Malaysian economy. It is a convenient 
one since it at once blames the colonial power for the current composition of the 
population and also leaves the Malays as hapless victims of imperial exploitation. It also 
suggests that the Malays did not receive anything from the exploitation of the Peninsula’s 
mineral wealth. The story is not quite so simple. 
The eighteenth century Malay rulers, the Chinese junk traders, and British country 
traders were all eager to subvert the Dutch attempts at monopoly because there was an 
increasing demand for the metal. The real demand for tin at this time was not in Europe. 
Rather, the demand was in China. The British and Dutch only wanted tin to sell to the 
Chinese. The question is, why did the Chinese want it? 
Until quite recently, it has been one of those interesting but not really pressing 
questions about world trade. European knowledge of the workings of China’s interior 
markets was really quite limited until the later part of the nineteenth century when they 
were actually able to get in on the ground. We do know, however, that a part of the 
Chinese economic boom of the eighteenth century saw a real increase in demand for a 
number of products from Southeast Asia. This included a demand for pepper, gambier, 
tapioca, rattan, Southeast Asian aromatics like sandalwood and camphor, as well as tin, 
gold and other minerals.  
Clearly this was part of an overall expansion in the economy that came with peace 
and a population explosion. It was the so-called “Qing boom”. But, this explanation does 
not really get to the heart of why they needed so much tin. One explanation has been that 
tin foil was used in Buddhist and other shrines to place on the images, just as gold foil is 
today. Wong Lin Ken claims that the tin leaves were burnt as sacrificial offerings. (Wong, 
1965:13) I was never quite satisfied with that explanation. This is especially the case 
when one considers a few simple facts that have been well known for some time. 
The first is that the tin mines of Bangka which were among the most productive in 
the region went into large-scale production around the 1720s. The same is true for gold 
mines in western Borneo along the Kapuas River near Pontianak, and near Sambas and in 
Sarawak. By 1780, James C. Jackson estimates that there were 40,000 Chinese miners 
settled in western Borneo. There were another 25,000 tin miners on Bangka (Jackson 
1969; Jackson 1970). I have estimated that there were about 10,000 pepper and gambier 
planters on the island of Bentan in the Riau Archipelago at about the same time (Trocki 
1979). This is only part of the picture. At the same time we find there were similar 
settlements of other tin miners, pepper planters, sugar planters and others all around the 
shore of the Gulf of Siam, both shores of the Straits of Melaka, and around the coasts of 
Borneo. 
Knowledge about these growing settlements in Southeast Asia has been 
accumulating for the past several decades. Recent scholarship has given us a clearer 
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picture, not only of the tin trade, but of the general interaction between China and 
Southeast Asia and the manner in which it was changing before the era of extensive 
European colonialism in the nineteenth century. One scholar, Paul Van Dyke, of the 
University of Macau has recently published a detailed study of the Canton trade, based on 
an exhaustive examination of Dutch, English, Portuguese, Chinese and other 
contemporary sources. His work has given us a much deeper understanding of the manner 
in which the trade of Canton functioned and of the relations between Chinese and 
European traders and of the connections to Southeast Asia.  
As we have long known, the major European interest in China at that time was the 
tea trade, and Van Dyke’s discussion of the tea trade has provided some answers to what 
was happening in Southeast Asia. As a commercial product, tea has a number of important 
characteristics. Its most important qualities, its taste and aroma, are fragile and transient 
things. If the tea is not packed tightly immediately after it is cured, the tea loses much of 
its taste and aroma. This means that it is important for the tea to be packed quite close to 
the area of production so as to retain as much as possible of the taste. The packaging thus, 
must be light, durable and very stable chemically, so that it will not oxidize or otherwise 
affect the taste of the tea. Not only that, the packaging material had to be easy to work, 
since the containers had to be made on the site. 
This was where specialized knowledge and the ability to exploit that knowledge 
came into play. The trading world of the era was one characterized by the relatively 
opaque nature of markets and supply areas. As it turned out, tin was the perfect material 
for the packaging of tea. It was light in weight, easily worked and very stable, moreover, it 
was abundantly available, if one knew where it was and how to get it.  
It seems that the people who were able to put together these pieces of information 
and turn them into a profitable trade were the Straits Chinese. The so-called “Baba” 
merchants who were resident in Southeast Asian ports, who were often married to local 
women became the pivotal group in unleashing the new forces that arose in Southeast 
Asia during the eighteenth century. As people whose lives and fortunes depended on the 
trade between China and Southeast Asia they were the ones who were familiar with local 
resources and markets. They understood the nature and limitations of local economies and 
were adept at exploiting them.   
There were communities of these Chinese merchants in virtually every port in the 
region whether under European or indigenous control. The wealthiest of them were 
revenue farmers or factotums in the employ of Asian monarchs and chiefs. They also had 
good connections with Chinese junk traders and mariners, using their ships to move their 
goods. Finally, they had direct links to the China market, both through Canton and the 
Fujian ports. While there are few sources on the issue of their ethnicity, it appears that 
most of these overseas merchants were originally from Fujian, although it is clear there 
were a certain number of Cantonese traders in the region. Overall, the Fujian traders, or 
the Hokkiens, as they were known in Singapore, tended to be in the Dutch ports, the 
Malay ports and in Siam. Cochinchina, at least from the 1650s onward, seems to have 
been dominated by Cantonese traders and mariners with the possible exception of Hoi An, 
which seems to have been a Fujian centre.  
As the European demand for tea began to escalate in the late seventeenth century, 
it is logical that the demand for the ancillary materials necessary to pack the product 
would have risen commensurately. Products such as tin, rattan, lead were necessary to 
support the tea export. 
As Van Dyke (2005: 149) has pointed out, a lack of lead could limit the amount of 
tea that could be exported (wooden chests were durable and could be stacked in many 
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layers but they needed to be lined with lead to prevent contamination); and a lack of tin 
could affect the Hong merchants’ dealings with the inland tea merchants, who needed that 
metal to make canisters to send the tea to Canton (tin canisters were light and protected 
the tea from contamination better than other containers); a lack of rattan between the 
layers of tea chests could affect tea sales as well (rattan was thin, flexible, strong, and had 
no aromatic qualities that could infect the tea). Carl: is this para above a quotation??YES 
An example of the types of connections is indicated in the events reported by 
Barbara Andaya regarding the establishment of the Chinese tin-mining colony on Bangka. 
She has drawn attention to the influence of the part-Chinese wife of Sultan Mahmud, the 
ruler of Palembang. part-Chinese wife (??)She and her peranakan father were crucial in 
the organization and management of the colony (Andaya 1993: 188-190). It was not long 
before ambitious Chinese from all over Southeast Asia and from China itself flocked to 
Bangka to seek their fortunes. What is clear, in all of this, however, is the role played by 
the key figures in the local peranakan community, and their command of markets and 
demands at both ends of the supply chain. 
It is impossible for us to know whether the Straits Chinese merchants understood 
all of the necessities of the tea trade. One would be surprised, however, if they did not. 
After all, tea was a product of Fujian, and most of the overseas merchants at this time 
were of Fujian origin. As Van Dyke (2005) has shown, there was a network of 
connections between Fujian and Canton and from them to the South Seas which included 
not only Fujian and Cantonese merchants, but also Europeans both inside and outside the 
big trading companies. These links included loans between Chinese and European 
merchants and the practices of shipping goods in each other’s craft. 
The expansion of tin mining in Bangka and in other places on the Malay Peninsula 
was not only a matter of identifying a needed resource and bringing it to the market. There 
was the additional issue of how to increase production in order to meet the increased 
demand. This could only be done by finding a way to supplement the workforce. This 
seems to have been a key contribution of these overseas merchants. 
This migration of Chinese labor into the Nanyang and the organization of the 
workforce into the systematic production of an increasing range of Southeast Asian 
products was a key breakthrough. This new workforce was a major innovation for the 
region and has brought about an important transformation in the area which has had both 
short term and long term effects. 
In the short run, the new labor force substantially increased the output of Southeast 
Asian products. In particular, we can point to tin, gold, pepper, and gambier in the first 
instance. Later, we can note the production of other minerals as well as crops such as 
tapioca, sugar, tobacco, and indigo. These colonies of laborers became a new source of 
wealth for Southeast Asian rulers, as well as for their Chinese associates who helped to 
organize the migration and the production processes. We also see the employment of 
skills and production methods that were hitherto unknown in the region. Thus there was a 
transfer of technology, or at least the import of new technologies (can you give an 
example of such technology?) and their use in Southeast Asia. 
By way of example, the Chinese are credited with introducing the changkol, a 
heavy-duty, all-purpose hoe, to Southeast Asia. They also brought the chain-pump (chin 
chia) to the region which was effective in keeping deep pits clear of water. In addition to 
their large numbers and efficient organization, Chinese miners brought a range of other 
drainage techniques using canals, water-races and sluices to help clear away the 
overburden and wash the ore. Beyond that their blast furnaces and bellows were capable 
of smelting a much higher quality of metal. (Wong, 1965:48-52) 
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Beyond this, we also have to note the broader economic impact of these new 
settlements. The fact that most of them were located in largely virgin territory presented a 
range of new situations. Almost all of these settlements had to be fed and supported from 
outside. They needed supplies of rice, tools, cloth, and whatever amenities were in 
demand among the laboring population. These goods were supplied in exchange for the 
products being produced in any given area. As a result, within these settlements we see 
the development of cash-based consumer economies. Judging from what we know of the 
agricultural economy of early Singapore, we can get some idea of how these eighteenth 
century economies operated (Trocki 1979; Trocki 1990). Coolies were paid in cash, or at 
least their earnings were calculated as cash. Payments to the laborers were usually made 
in advance in the form of provisions and then accounts were settled when the product was 
sold. Very often laborers may have been in debt for their passage. Perhaps something like 
the credit-ticket system was already in operation. Whatever the case, the indications are 
that the system of advances and settlements was well-established in the region before 
Singapore was founded. These laboring communities thus became important centers of a 
new import-export economy. 
As I have argued elsewhere, this new economy was on the verge of transforming 
Southeast Asia by the 1780s (Trocki 1979; Trocki 1990). A considerable number of new 
settlements had been opened in the region in the years between 1700 and the middle years 
of the century. They came to constitute an economy that brought together an entire 
constellation of new actors and new forces. These included the Chinese merchants based 
in Southeast Asia, the Babas, or Straits-born Chinese most especially, since they seem to 
be the ones we can credit with having created it. As the same time, it drew in new actors 
from China: mariners, traders, laborers and a whole range of craftsmen and other service 
providers to support them. 
Within Southeast Asia, it provided the incentive for a new phase of vigorous state 
formation such as took place in Riau, Sulu, Kedah, and later on, in Siam and Vietnam. It 
challenged the older economies, particularly that of the VOC. In particular, groups such as 
the Bugis, both those based in Sulawesi as well as those in Riau and North Java and 
Borneo responded to the new economic developments and became a part of them.  
The economic growth in the region, although fuelled largely by demand in the 
China market, also drew the English country traders whose ships had been frequenting 
Southeast Asian waters in increasing numbers during the second half of the eighteenth 
century. With their cargoes of opium, Indian cloth, gunpowder, arms and ammunition, 
they found a ready market for many of their products in Southeast Asia. They were able to 
turn over a portion of their cargoes before they arrived in China and supplement their 
goods with products from Southeast Asia which had a market in China. Here too, it was 
the Baba Chinese who had close connections to the colonies of laborers on the mines and 
plantations in the interior. For them, the British traders were an alternative source of 
supply for these settlements and a supplementary market for their products.  
The progress of this new economy suffered a few setbacks in the final decades of 
the eighteenth century. Certainly the Napoleonic wars and subsequent upheavals in world 
affairs had an impact in the region. The Dutch measures to destroy the trading centre 
which had grown up in Riau in 1784-6 were, I believe nearly fatal to many of the 
enterprises which had been started in the region of the Straits. Palembang/Bangka, 
Pontianak, Sambas, Riau and the west coast states of the Peninsula all suffered from this 
attack. Riau had been coming into its own as an entrepot for much of this new economic 
activity. All that came to an abrupt halt. 
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At the same time, however, there were other developments in other parts of the 
region which were equally detrimental to the rise of this new economy. Of crucial 
importance was the fall of Siam and the sack of Ayuthaya by the Burmese in 1767, an 
event which was shortly followed by the victory of the Tayson brothers in Vietnam and 
the collapse of the northern Trinh state and Dang Troung in the south. Hatien, which like 
Riau, had been acting as an entrepot for much of this new trade in the Gulf of Siam was 
largely destroyed and disempowered by the time peace was restored in the early 
nineteenth century (Rungswasdisab 2004). 
It is, however, an ill wind that blows no good. The new forces which were set in 
motion during the eighteenth century constituted permanent shifts, and despite the 
setbacks, fundamental changes had been put in place. The rebuilding of both Siam and 
Vietnam in the early nineteenth century, was largely the work of the men from these new 
Chinese settlements around the Gulf of Siam. Singapore too, was to become the 
beneficiary of these new forces. Although Singapore was established by the British and 
was largely intended to protect and serve the British country traders who feared the re-
establishment of Dutch power in the Straits of Melaka, it became a centre for Chinese 
trade. It was the port which benefited the most from the Chinese economy of commodity 
production which had been established during the eighteenth century.   
Singapore’s early economy was mainly based on the products of Chinese labor. It 
flourished as a centre for the Chinese and Southeast Asian trade. Moreover, Singapore 
became the service centre, if you like, for the new productive settlements of Chinese labor 
which had been set up during the eighteenth century boom. It was the concentration point 
for the products of these many settlements in the Peninsula, Borneo, Sumatra and the 
islands. It was also the distribution point for goods to supply these centers and to keep 
them alive. Foodstuffs, cloth, tools, goods for everyday living (such as candles, 
chopsticks, dishes, umbrellas, etc) all came through Singapore on their way from China to 
places like Riau, Pontianak, Sambas, Bangka, Siak, Perak, etc.  
Most important, however, Singapore became the major labor exchange for 
Southeast Asia. Chinese labor now flocked first to Singapore and from here, like the other 
products which supplied the new Chinese settlements of the Southeast Asian jungles, was 
redistributed. Within Singapore, the infamous “credit-ticket” system became the 
established way of recruiting a labor force. A network of recruiters were sent out from 
Singapore, often men who had come from certain districts in China and had spent some 
time in Southeast Asia. These were employed by the Baba merchants of Singapore and 
Penang to return to China and encourage strong young men to migrate to Singapore. Their 
passages would be paid in advance by the recruiter with funds supplied by their employers 
in the Straits. They would come to Singapore and their debts would be transferred to the 
capitalists managing the mines and plantations. This pattern became the backbone of 
Singapore’s economy in for the first seven or eight decades of the colony’s existence. 
Most of the wealthiest merchants in Singapore were involved in either mining or planting, 
and they thus were a part of coolie broking business, since these depended on the supply 
of labor from China. 
One of the major problems facing these enterprises was that of control. Coolies 
could be controlled in Singapore since they were unfamiliar with the place and could 
easily be herded into secure boarding houses and held there until buyers were found for 
their contracts. On the other hand, once established at their workplaces, most of which 
were far from Singapore, the Singapore merchants had little control over the workforce.  
Labor was managed, or perhaps managed itself in the mines and plantations by the 
kongsi. These were sworn brotherhoods which bound the workers together and allowed 
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them a share of the profits of the venture. While the Baba merchants may have been 
instrumental in setting up the kongsi in his mine or plantation, it is questionable how 
much influence he was able to exercise in the long run. It is clear that in several cases, 
kongsis became quite independent and begin to function as virtually autonomous 
governing bodies. This was apparently the case with the kongsis in western Borneo in 
Pontianak and Sambas. For those in Bangka and Riau the issue is less certain. From my 
own work on the pepper and gambier agriculture in Singapore and Johor, it seems that the 
kongsis may have been part of the system of control and integrated into or together with 
the Ngee Heng, or Ghee Hin secret society which was considered a branch of the 
Tiandihui, or the Heaven and Earth Society.   
The key to labor control, as I have argued elsewhere, was opium. It was also the 
key to the profitability of the whole venture (Trocki 1990). In addition to supplying the 
workers with supplies and taking their products as payment, the merchants took care to 
make sure they monopolized these functions for the settlements which they financed. 
Even though the prices of supplies were marked up, and payments for products were 
below market value, the merchants apparently felt that profits were insufficient. 
Moreover, there was always the possibility that the laborers would run away if their shares 
were too low. Merchants thus found it useful to hold monopolies on the sale of opium, 
alcohol and other such consumables. These were the farms. They were purchased from the 
colonial government at auction.  
Coolies came to depend on opium, partly because they became addicted to it, but 
also because it was perhaps the only source of medication and of pleasure available to 
them. If not a pleasure, at least it reduced some of their pain. Continuous opium purchases 
could get the workers in debt and keep them there. Profits from the opium farms provided 
the merchants with an appreciable return on their investments and made it possible to 
recoup the salaries paid to the laborers. Merchants were able to buy out the secret societies 
and kongsis and use them as agencies of control on the plantations and mines. Indeed, 
much of the conflict involving secret societies in the 1840s and 1850s seems to have been 
related to the suppression of worker organizations by groups affiliated with the merchant 
classes, primarily the Baba merchants (Trocki 1990). 
The opium farmers were the most powerful and influential Chinese in nineteenth 
century Singapore. They controlled one of the most lucrative sources of cash in the colony 
and paid the government a major share of its tax revenue. Since they needed to work with 
colonial officials, the opium farmers were almost all Baba Chinese. Over time, control of 
the Singapore opium farm made it possible for these same Chinese to expand their 
empires to surrounding areas.  
An important part of Singapore’s business was done with these nearby settlements 
of Chinese laborers who were producing goods for export to China. This also applies to at 
least some of the trade listed with Siam, Cochinchina and destinations within the Gulf of 
Siam. Wong Lin Ken’s important study on the trade of Singapore shows that most of 
Singapore’s trade was conducted with countries on the Gulf of Siam, the Straits of Melaka 
and, the islands to the South, extending to Java and Bali. In the years between 1829 and 
1869, this region generally accounted for about 40% of Singapore’s total trade (Wong 
1960: 225). Significantly, this was precisely the region in which most of these settlements 
of Chinese laborers were located. (See Map) please attach it!. 
A key vehicle of this trade, in addition to the junks and Malaysian craft that plied 
between Singapore and these destinations was what Wong has styled the sampan pukat 
trade. The pukat was a large rowboat, about 20 m. long and about 3 m. wide and 1.5 m. 
deep. They carried crews of about 29 men, mostly oarsmen and generally plied along the 
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Straits of Melaka, the Riau-Lingga Archipelago, the coasts of Borneo and the East Coast 
of the Malaya Peninsula. Most of these were owned by Singapore merchants. Song Ong 
Siang reports how the important Teochew taukeh, Seah Eu Chin got his start as a 
commission agent on one of these vessels (Song 1923:19-20). He was in the employ of 
Yeo Kim Swee, a Baba merchant of Singapore. In fact, it was through Yeo that Seah, who 
was China-born and came to Singapore at the age of 25, gained entrance into the 
Singapore Baba community (Lim 1999:8). 
By the 1830s the Baba community of Singapore, many of whom had come from 
Melaka, had come to dominate the economy of Singapore. Ivy Lim describes them as 
follows: 
The Straits Chinese were wealthy and educated in English. This was so especially 
for those from Malacca where they had resided under the Portuguese, Dutch and British 
rules. Their linguistic fluency and wealth distinguished them from the impoverished and 
uneducated immigrant Chinese. And the British naturally looked upon them as the better 
class within the Chinese community and cultivated them to be a channel between the 
Chinese community and themselves (Lim 1999). Carl: is the text in blue a 
quotation??YES 
She points out, however, that it was possible for China-born men such as Seah Eu 
Chin, who were able to gain wealth, to gain entry into this privileged class. 
As intermediaries between the masses of the Chinese and the British ruling class, 
the Babas were useful as tax collectors. This was a role which many of them had fulfilled 
when resident in the Dutch colonies and in the native states of the region, particularly in 
Java and Sumatra. In Singapore, in the early years, the farms had been dominated by 
Babas. As the farms came to be more dependent on pepper and gambier coolies as 
consumers, it became necessary for the Babas to form strategic alliances with the 
Teochew and Hakka taukehs who dominated the cultivation and who had contacts with 
the kangchus who ran the pepper and gambier settlement in the interior and in Johor. 
Many of these were either Tiandihui leaders or were closely associated with the other 
secret societies. Individuals such as Lau Joon Tek were representative of this sort of 
leader (Trocki 1990: 103-107). 
As the farms grew they came to be managed by rather large cliques of the most 
powerful merchants in the various colonies and settlements. They financed their 
syndicates by breaking them up into shares and selling the shares to other Chinese in the 
community. These syndicates or kongsis as they were also called often had an ethnic basis 
and competed for control of the farms in their settlement. In Singapore there was a 
Hokkien syndicate led by Cheang Hong Lim in the 1870s and 1880s and a Teochew 
syndicate led by Tan Seng Poh in the 1860s and 1870s. In Saigon, the Hokkiens were 
opposed by a Cantonese syndicate. In the absence of any other stable financial institutions 
(with the exception of European banks) the farms became the favored instruments of 
capital accumulation among the wealthier Chinese. This need to draw funds from the 
entire community, as well as the need to provide investment opportunities for all probably 
aided in the trend toward consolidation and compromise between ethnic cliques. 
Opium revenues became the major prop of the colonial states in Southeast Asia. In 
Singapore the farm income varied between 40 and 60 percent of local revenues. Opium 
smoking coolies literally paid for Singapore’s free trade. In Java and Siam, the farms 
brought in about 35 percent of total revenues throughout the nineteenth century. The 
farms also spared these governments the burden of expense needed to police the tax 
collection regime. They also served to police the Chinese community in general. The 
alliance between revenue farmers, particularly the opium and spirit farmers (Carl: please 
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explain what a spirit farmer is) (SPIRITOUS LIQUORS, DISTILLED SPIRITS) and the 
ritual brotherhoods gave them a ready-made police force.  
Conclusion 
The overall aim here has been to explore the role of the Straits-born or peranakan 
Chinese as knowledge managers in the shifting relationships between China and Southeast 
Asia. It is clear that the major change in the economic role of China in Southeast Asia was 
in its increasing appetite for certain Southeast Asian products. These included minerals 
such as tin, gold, and lead; agricultural products like pepper, sugar, tapioca, and rice; and 
forest and jungle produce such as rattan, timber, resins, skins, feathers, birds’ nests, etc.; 
and finally maritime products such as shark fins, beche de mer, pearls, mother of pearl, 
coral, agar-agar, etc.  
It was knowledge about these products that was an important aspect of the 
strategic importance of the Baba Chinese. Their presence in Southeast Asia helped them 
to dominate the collection of these goods and to profit from their movement to China. On 
the other hand, their knowledge of the demands of the Chinese markets was equally 
important in identifying the Southeast Asian products that could fit that market. 
As I have tried to show, it began with tin and tea, and then led to mining and 
expanded settlements of Chinese laborers in Southeast Asia. These communities laid the 
foundation for a new economy based on Chinese labor, commodity production and opium 
consumption. By the nineteenth century, this economic system became the major prop of 
Singapore’s economy. Throughout the period of its growth, the Straits Chinese seem to 
have been instrumental as the class of knowledge managers in making the new system 
work. 
This knowledge made them the key intermediaries in developing the new 
industries and trades from Southeast Asia to China. At the same time, however, they also 
were strategically positioned in regard to certain management tasks. It was clear that 
already in the seventeenth century, the local Chinese had made themselves useful as 
revenue farmers for the Dutch and probably for other Southeast Asian rulers (Kwee Hui 
Kian 2004). Their skill in managing enterprises of this sort made them invaluable allies to 
the British and other colonial powers in the nineteenth century as the various powers 
established new political units and developed workable administrative structures. Not only 
were they able to organize new forms of industrial production in Southeast Asia based on 
the skills of Chinese laborers, but they were able to manage the outputs of these 
settlements as well as integrate them into the political economies of the emerging colonial 
empires. This ability of the Straits-born Chinese, as a group, to pioneer in the 
development of the Southeast Asian economy and to maintain a dominating position in 
the region throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has placed them seems an 
extraordinary accomplishment, and demonstrates, I believe, the role in while strategic 
knowledge management has played in their success as a class. 
Endnotes 
Carl A. Trocki is the Professor of Asian Studies in the School of Humanities and 
Human Services at the Queensland University of Technology in Brisbane, Australia.  
 10
References 
Andaya, B. W. 1993. To Live as Brothers: Southeast Sumatra in the Seventeenth and 
Eighteenth Centuries. Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press. 
Jackson, J. C. 1969. "Mining in 18th Century Bangka; The Pre-European Exploitation of a 
'Tin Island'." Pacific Viewpoint 10(2): 28-54. 
Jackson, J. C. 1970. Chinese in the West Borneo Goldfields: A Study in Cultural 
Geography. Hull: University of Hull. 
Kwee Hui Kian 2004. Trade-Offs, Gambles and Capitalization: Tax Farming on the 
Java's Northeast Coast, 1740s-1790s. The International Association of Historians 
of Asia, The 18th Conference. Taipei, Taiwan. (Reference seems incomplete, was 
this a conf paper? 
Lim, M. L., Ivy Maria 1999. In Between Worlds: Teochew Chinese Leadership in 
Colonial Singapore. School of Arts. Singapore, National Institute of Education, 
Nanyang Technological University: 172. (what does this no mean?) 
Rungswasdisab, P. 2004. "Siam and the Contest for Control of the Trans-Mekong Trading 
Networks from the Late Eighteenth to the Mid-Nineteenth Centuries." In N. Cooke 
and T Li. (eds.) Water Frontier: Commerce and the Chinese in the Lower Mekong 
Region, 1750-1880. Singapore: Singapore University Press and Rowman and 
Littlefield Publishers: 101-118. 
Song, O. S. 1923. One Hundred Years' History of the Chinese in Singapore. Singapore: 
University of Malaya Press. 
Trocki, C. A. 1979. Prince of Pirates: The Temenggongs and the Development of Johor 
and Singapore, 1784-1885. Singapore: Singapore University Press. 
Trocki, C. A. 1990. Opium and Empire:  Chinese Society in Colonial Singapore 1800-
1910. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. 
Van Dyke, P. A. 2005. The Canton Trade: Life and Enterprise on the China Coast, 1700-
1845. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. 
Wong, L. K. 1960. "The Trade of Singapore, 1819-1869." Journal of the 
Malayan/Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society 33(4), December, 1860: 
1-135 (please check whether reference is ok). 
Wong, L. K. 1965. The Malayan Tin Industry. Tucson, Ariz.: Association of Asian 
Studies. 
 
